The present experiments extend the temporal discounting paradigm from choice between an immediate and a delayed reward to choice between 2 delayed rewards: a smaller amount of money available sooner and a larger amount available later. Across different amounts and delays, the data were consistently well described by a hyperbola-like discounting function, and the degree of discounting decreased systematically as the delay to the sooner reward increased. Three theoretical models (the elimination-by-aspects, present-value comparison, and common-aspect attenuation hypotheses) were evaluated. The best account of the data was provided by the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, according to which the common aspect of the choice alternatives (i.e., the time until the sooner reward is available) receives less weight in the decision-making process.
Individuals often choose smaller rewards that are available immediately over larger rewards that are available later. One account of this phenomenon assumes that the value of a delayed reward is discounted. Thus, a smaller, immediate reward, whose value is not discounted, may be preferred to a larger, delayed reward, whose value is discounted (Ainslie, 1992; Rachlin, 2000 ; for a review, see Green & Myerson, 2004) . Although in principle the discounting framework may be extended to choice between two delayed rewards, in practice this extension is not straightforward because it requires making strong theoretical assumptions with very little empirical guidance. The present study evaluates several alternative theoretical hypotheses in order to illuminate the process by which individuals choose between delayed rewards.
Discounting of delayed rewards typically is assessed by having participants choose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards, although similar findings have been obtained with real rewards (e.g., Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003) . The amount of the immediate reward is adjusted until participants judge the immediate and delayed rewards to be of equal value, and the amount of immediate reward so determined is taken to be the discounted or present value of the delayed reward. By holding the amount of the delayed reward constant and varying the delay until its receipt, it is possible to map out a temporal discounting function that describes the relationship between delay and present value.
The data obtained using such a procedure are well described by a hyperbolic model as represented by a discounting function of the form
where a reward of amount A, available after a delay, D, has a present, subjective value of V. The parameter k describes how steeply the value of the delayed amount is discounted, where larger values of k indicate steeper rates of discounting (for a review, see Green & Myerson, 2004 ). The parameter s, which is assumed to reflect the underlying scaling of time and/or amount, governs the shape of the discounting function (Myerson & Green, 1995) . When s equals 1.0, the form is that of a simple hyperbola (Mazur, 1987) .
Equation 1, with values of s usually equal to or less than 1.0, accurately describes discounting in the typical experimental scenario involving choice between an immediate and a delayed reward. Many decisions outside the laboratory, however, involve situations in which one must choose between a larger reward that would be available after a long delay and a smaller reward available sooner, but not immediately. It remains to be seen whether Equation 1 can describe discounting functions obtained when choice involves two rewards, both of which are delayed.
The extension of the hyperbolic model to choice between two delayed rewards is important in part because such an extension would support the generality of the model and argue for its applicability to familiar, real-world situations involving choice between delayed alternatives. In addition, the hyperbolic form of the discounting function often is used to explain preference reversals (e.g., Ainslie, 1992) , which represent a fundamental anomaly with respect to standard economic theory (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) . More specifically, although a smaller reward available after a brief delay may be preferred to a larger reward available only after a longer delay, increasing both delays equally often leads to a reversal in preference such that the larger, later reward comes to be preferred to the smaller, sooner one (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; Green, Fisher, Perlow, & Sherman, 1981; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Rachlin, 2000) . Although such preference reversals are consistent with a hyperbolic discounting function, studies that have examined such reversals have not actually mapped out the discounting function in situations involving two delayed rewards.
Thus, it remains to be determined whether Equation 1 describes choice between two delayed rewards. If it does, then a comparison of the parameter values obtained when the sooner reward is im-mediate versus when it is delayed might shed significant light on the underlying decision-making process. For example, if people are sensitive only to the interval between the two outcomes (i.e., how much time separates the sooner and the more delayed rewards), then whether the sooner reward is available immediately or in 5 years should have no effect on the parameter values. That is, the estimated value of the discounting rate parameter k should be independent of the time to the sooner reward. Such independence would provide evidence for the kind of elimination-by-aspects decision process hypothesized by Tversky (1972) and used to explain the isolation effect observed with choices involving probabilistic rewards (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) .
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , the isolation effect reflects the fact that people tend to focus on those aspects of outcomes that are unique and ignore those that are shared. For example, in a choice between $500 in 1 year and $1,000 in 3 years, both options share a 1-year wait. If shared delays are eliminated in choosing between delayed rewards, then the decision would be the same if the choice were between $500 in 6 years and $1,000 in 8 years. Thus, as applied to choice between delayed rewards, elimination by aspects would involve ignoring the time to the sooner reward because this time is common to both outcomes. Although this theory has not been applied previously to intertemporal choice, the extension seems a natural one. Nevertheless, in order to distinguish this application from the original theory, we refer to it here as the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis.
Alternatively, people may not ignore the common delay but rather may simply compare the present, discounted value of the sooner reward with the present, discounted value of the later reward. This view is implicit in the behavioral economic account of preference reversals (Ainslie, 1992; Green et al., 1981; Rachlin, 2000) . According to this view, each reward is discounted based on the entire duration of the wait from the time at which the choice is made until the time at which the reward could be received. We term this view the present-value comparison hypothesis. As shown in the Appendix, this hypothesis predicts that the value of the discounting rate parameter (k in Equation 1) decreases with increases in the time to the sooner reward as reflected in increases in the amount of sooner reward judged equal in value to the later reward.
There is, of course, an intermediate possibility: Choice may be affected by the common delay (i.e., the time to the sooner reward), but people may not take it fully into account when evaluating the two rewards. Instead, the value of the later reward may be discounted based on the difference between the delays to the sooner and later rewards (i.e., the amount of waiting which the later reward does not share with the sooner reward) plus some proportion of the delay to the sooner reward (which is common to both choice alternatives). Similarly, the value of the sooner reward may be discounted based not on the full delay to its receipt but on some proportion of that delay. We term this view the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis. Like the present-value comparison hypothesis, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis also predicts that the value of the discounting rate parameter decreases with increases in the time to the sooner reward (see the Appendix).
According to Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) , when a constant is added to the magnitude of a particular attribute of the choice alternatives, the importance of that attribute decreases, a phenomenon they termed decreasing absolute sensitivity. In the present case, the decreasing-absolute-sensitivity hypothesis predicts that addition of a constant to the delay to the sooner reward decreases the influence of the time dimension, thereby increasing the relative influence of the monetary amounts involved. As a consequence, delayed rewards will be discounted progressively less steeply as the delay to the sooner reward is increased. As we show later in this article, both the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis predict decreasing absolute sensitivity, whereas the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis does not.
The primary goals of the present study were to determine whether the hyperbolic model (Equation 1) describes discounting in situations in which both rewards are delayed and to evaluate the alternative hypotheses regarding the influence of the delay common to both outcomes. At issue in the first experiment was whether people ignore the delay to the sooner reward, as predicted by the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis, or whether they exhibit decreasing absolute sensitivity, as evidenced by a decrease in the rate of discounting as the delays to both rewards are increased equally. Because decreasing absolute sensitivity was observed in Experiment 1, a second experiment was conducted to determine whether decreasing absolute sensitivity results from a discounting process in which the delay to the sooner reward exerts the full influence predicted by the present-value comparison hypothesis, or whether the influence of the delay to the sooner reward is underweighted, as predicted by the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, participants chose between two rewards, one available sooner and another, larger one that was available later. The amount of the later reward was either $200 or $10,000, and depending on participants' choices, the amount of the sooner reward was adjusted to determine how much the later reward was worth in dollars available sooner. In different conditions, the delay to the sooner reward was varied whereas the times between the availability of the sooner and later rewards were held constant. Temporal discounting functions were mapped out for each individual at each value of the delay to the sooner reward, and analysis focused on whether there were systematic changes in these functions as the amount of the later reward and the time to the sooner reward were varied.
Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate students at Washington University were recruited through the Department of Psychology's participants pool and received course credit for their participation.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. During the experimental session, which lasted approximately 30 min, participants were seated at a desk with a personal computer and a monitor. The experimenter was present throughout.
The computer-administered discounting procedure involved a series of choices between hypothetical monetary rewards, one amount available sooner and the other amount available later (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002) . Participants read the following instructions on the monitor prior to beginning the experiment:
In this task you will be asked to make a series of choices between two hypothetical amounts of money that will be shown on the screen. One amount is the amount of money you could receive after a delay. The other amount is the amount of money you could receive after a longer delay. The lengths of the two delays will be shown on the screen.
The amount available after the shorter delay will vary from problem to problem, but the amount available after the longer delay will remain the same. For each problem, please indicate which option you would prefer. If you would prefer the amount shown on the left side of the screen, press the "z" key; if you would prefer the amount shown on the right side of the screen, then press the "m" key.
You will be given a few practice problems before starting the task. Please keep in mind that there are no "correct" answers. We are only interested in which option you would prefer. If these instructions seem confusing now, don't worry. It will all become clear after the practice choices.
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter at this time. Once the experiment begins, the experimenter will only be allowed to answer procedural questions.
Following six practice trials, the experiment began. The experiment consisted of eight conditions: Two amounts of the later reward ($200 and $10,000) were crossed with four delays to the sooner reward (0, 2, 5, and 10 years). Within each condition, there were five values for the interreward interval (i.e., the time between the sooner and later rewards): 0.5, 1.5, 3, 5, and 10 years. For example, when the delay to the sooner reward was 2 years, the delays to the later reward shown to the participant were 2.5, 3.5, 5, 7, and 12 years. The order of the eight conditions was determined randomly for each participant, and within each condition, the interreward intervals were presented in ascending order.
For each interreward interval in each condition, an adjusting-amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of a sooner reward equal in subjective value to the later reward. This procedure began with a choice between a larger amount of reward available later and a reward of half that amount available sooner. On each subsequent trial in the sequence, the amount of the sooner reward that was presented depended on the participant's choice on the previous trial. If the participant chose the later reward, then the amount of the sooner was increased on the following trial; if the participant chose the sooner reward, then the amount of the sooner reward was decreased on the following trial. On each trial, participants not only saw the choice alternatives but also saw instructions informing them that if they wanted to change their decisions, pressing the b key would restart the current sequence of trials.
Consider the case in which a participant was asked to choose between $200 in 5 years and a smaller amount in 2 years. The smaller amount presented on the first trial would have been $100. The amount of the sooner reward on the second trial depended on the participant's choice on the first trial. If the participant selected the later reward ($200 in 5 years) on Trial 1, then the sooner amount was increased by 50%, to $150. If the sooner reward was chosen on Trial 1, then the amount of the sooner option was decreased by 50%, to $50. On each subsequent trial, the size of the adjustment in the amount of the sooner reward decreased by half. In the present example, adjustments (increases or decreases) on subsequent trials would be $25, $12.50, and so forth. This process converges on an amount of sooner reward that has a subjective value close to that of the later reward. This use of the term subjective value, measured in dollars available at the time of the sooner reward, may be distinguished from the term present value, which corresponds to the amount of an immediate reward that is judged equal in value to the delayed reward.
In each condition, six trials were presented for each interreward interval. The subjective value of the later reward was estimated based on the participant's choice on the last (sixth) trial. If the participant chose the sooner reward, then the subjective value of the delayed reward was assumed to be slightly less than the current amount of the sooner reward on that trial, whereas if the participant chose the later reward, the subjective value was assumed to be slightly more than the current amount of the sooner reward. Specifically, the subjective value was calculated as the amount halfway between the largest sooner reward that was preferred to the delayed reward and the smallest sooner reward that was preferred to the delayed reward. This estimate of the subjective value is equivalent to the amount that would have been presented on the next trial if another trial had been presented.
1
Results Table 1 presents the median subjective values of the later reward, expressed as a proportion of the actual amount ($200 or $10,000). Results are given for each delay to the sooner reward (0, 2, 5, and 10 years) and interreward interval (i.e., the time from the sooner reward to the later reward: 0.5, 1.5, 3, 5, and 10 years). Inspection of the table reveals three important findings. First, temporal discounting was observed in all conditions. That is, subjective value decreased systematically as a function of interreward interval as may be seen by reading across the rows in Table 1 .
Second, a magnitude effect also was observed such that the smaller ($200) amount was discounted more steeply than the larger ($10,000) amount. That is, for each delay to the sooner reward, the subjective value of the smaller amount at each interreward interval was always less than the subjective value of the larger amount at the corresponding interreward interval. For example, when the sooner reward was available immediately, the subjective value of $200 in 10 years was .200 compared with .492 for $10,000. Similarly, when the sooner reward was available after 5 years, the subjective value of $200 available 10 years later was .240 compared with .516 for $10,000. Thus, regardless of the delay to the sooner reward, the smaller amount was always discounted more steeply than the larger amount.
Third, and most important for present purposes, for each amount at each interreward interval, the subjective value of the later reward tends to increase as the delay to the sooner reward increases, indicating shallower discounting. That is, the amount of sooner reward whose value was judged equivalent to a later reward increases when a constant amount of time is added to the delays to both rewards. This may be seen by reading down the columns in Table 1 . For example, reading down the first column (0.5-year interreward interval), the first row indicates that the subjective value of $200 available in 0.5 years was .825 (as measured in immediately available dollars). In contrast, the third row of this column indicates that when 5 years is added to the delay to the sooner reward, the subjective value of $200 available 0.5 years later was .930 (in dollars available after 5 years). Thus, the value of a delayed reward was discounted less over the same interreward interval when the time to the sooner reward was longer. Figure 1 depicts the fit of the hyperbolic discounting model, 1 There were two possible exceptions to this rule. If a participant always chose the later reward or always chose the sooner reward, then the subjective value of the later reward was estimated to be halfway between the last presented sooner reward and the maximum (i.e., the later reward; $200 or $10,000, depending on the condition) or minimum (i.e., zero) amount, respectively.
with s set equal to 1.0, to the group median subjective values from Table 1 . The four panels represent data for the four different delays to the sooner reward. Within each panel, the circles represent the data for the $200 delayed amount and the squares represent the data for the $10,000 delayed amount. The solid curves represent the fits to the $200-amount data, and the dashed curves represent the fits to the $10,000-amount data. In all eight cases, the model accounted for more than 91% of the variance about the mean. As the delay to the sooner reward increased, the value of the k parameter decreased from 0.0387 to 0.0109 for the $200 delayed reward and from 0.0086 to 0.0047 for the $10,000 delayed reward. Allowing s to be a free parameter did not significantly improve the fits to the group medians. Although s was significantly less than 1.0 for 9 of the 30 participants and did not differ significantly from 1.0 for the other 21 participants, for purposes of simplicity and because of statistical problems that may arise because estimates of k and s are not independent (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001 ), we focus here on fits of a simple hyperbola (i.e., Equation 1 with s ϭ 1.0).
Examples of such fits to individual data are shown in Figure  2 . The right panels show data from the individual best fit by the simple hyperbolic model, based on the median proportion of variance accounted for across all eight conditions (R 2 ϭ .954). The left panels show data from 1 of the 2 individuals whose median proportion of variance accounted for by the simple hyperbolic model (R 2 ϭ .815) was closest to the group median value (R 2 ϭ .812). The effect of the delay to the sooner reward on discounting was assessed in two different ways, each of which attempts to deal with the fact that distributions of estimated values of the discounting rate parameter, k, typically are skewed. First, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the logarithms of the k values, revealing main effects of amount, F(1, 29) ϭ 73.62, p Ͻ .001, and delay to the sooner reward, F(3, 87) ϭ 18.48, p Ͻ .001, as well as a significant interaction between amount and delay, F(3, 87) ϭ 3.02, p Ͻ .05. Within-subjects contrasts revealed both a linear trend for delay to the sooner reward, F(1, 29) ϭ 46.81, p Ͻ .001, and an interaction between amount and delay, F(1, 29) ϭ 4.57, p Ͻ .05. The main effect of amount reflects steeper discounting of the smaller ($200) reward (i.e., the magnitude effect), and the linear trend indicates that the rate of discounting decreased systematically as the delay to the sooner reward increased. The interaction reflects the fact that the decrease in discounting rate with increases in delay was greater for the smaller amount.
Second, we conducted a parallel set of analyses using the area-under-the-curve measure of discounting proposed by Myerson et al. (2001) . The area measure provides another approach to the problem of skew in the k parameter. Moreover, because it may be calculated based on observed subjective values, rather than the values predicted by a particular theoretical equation, the area measure has the additional advantage that it allows one to compare the steepness of discounting without committing to a particular mathematical form of the discounting function. The area measure is normalized so that it ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, where 0.0 represents the steepest possible discounting and 1.0 represents no discounting at all (Myerson et al., 2001 ).
Area measures were calculated for each individual at each of the four delays to the sooner reward for both the $200 and $10,000 amounts. Figure 3 shows mean area under the curve as a function of the delay to the sooner reward. Consistent with the results of the analysis of the logarithms of the k-parameter estimates, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed main effects of amount, F(1, 29) ϭ 95.67, p Ͻ .001, and delay, F(3, 87) ϭ 24.10, p Ͻ .001, but the interaction was not significant, F(3, 87) ϭ 1.84. Within-subjects contrasts revealed a significant linear trend for delay to the sooner reward, F(1, 29) ϭ 51.62, p Ͻ .001, and the interaction between amount and delay failed to reach significance, F(1, 29) ϭ 3.44, p ϭ .074. Importantly, regardless of the measure used (i.e., the logarithm of k or the area under the curve), both a significant magnitude effect and a systematic decrease in discounting as the delay to the sooner reward increased were observed.
Discussion
Temporal discounting was well described by a hyperbola-like function (Equation 1) when participants chose between two delayed rewards and the subjective value of the later reward was measured in terms of dollars available after the briefer delay. There is a considerable body of evidence showing that this equation describes discounting at both the group and the individual levels when individuals choose between an immediate, smaller reward and a delayed, larger reward (for a review, see Green & Myerson, 2004) . The present study is the first to extend this finding to choice when both rewards are delayed. Although a simple hyperbola (Equation 1 with s ϭ 1.0) provided a good description of most participants' data, the inclusion of an exponent less than 1.0 Figure 3 . Area under the curve (group means and standard errors) as a function of the delay to the sooner reward for the $200 and $10,000 delayed amounts in Experiment 1. Also shown are the regression lines fit to the data for each delayed amount. resulted in a significantly better description for some participants. The latter finding is consistent with the results of previous studies examining choice between immediate and delayed rewards (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000) .
A robust magnitude effect was observed not only when the sooner reward was available immediately but also when the sooner reward was available after delays of 2, 5, or 10 years. Regardless of whether the degree of discounting was measured in terms of the discounting rate parameter (k) or as the area under the discounting data, the smaller ($200) amount was discounted more steeply than the larger ($10,000) amount. These results replicate and extend previous findings regarding the effect of amount of reward on temporal discounting in studies in which the choice was between an immediate and a delayed reward. Several studies have shown that as the amount of delayed reward increases, the value of k decreases, tending to level off at around $20,000 (Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Kirby, 1997) , but this is the first study to show a magnitude effect with choices involving two delayed rewards.
Progressive decreases in the degree of discounting were observed as the delay to the sooner reward increased. As noted previously, this pattern represents a systematic decrease in the absolute sensitivity to delay (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) and is predicted by both the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis. The observed decreases in the degree of discounting, however, are inconsistent with the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky, 1972) , because these decreases demonstrate that the participants did not ignore the common aspect of both alternatives (i.e., the amount of time to the sooner reward).
Although the obtained pattern of results is qualitatively consistent with both the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, it is not possible to derive quantitative predictions for Experiment 1 from either of these hypotheses. These hypotheses assume that the amount of sooner reward judged equal in value to the later reward depends on the discounting rates for both the sooner reward and the later reward. The discounting rate for the later reward is known, because its amount is fixed, and therefore its discounting rate can be determined based on choices between that amount and an immediate reward. The discounting rate for the sooner reward is not known, however, because the discounting rate depends on the amount of the sooner reward, and with the adjusting-amount procedure, the amount changes with each choice a participant makes.
This problem was circumvented in Experiment 2 by taking advantage of the fact that there are boundary conditions on the magnitude effect. That is, very large delayed rewards are discounted to a similar extent regardless of their amount (Green et al., 1997 (Green et al., , 1999 . Therefore, if the later reward is very large, the sooner reward amount judged equal in value to the later reward amount will be large enough so that both rewards will be discounted at approximately the same rate. Under such conditions, the predictions of both the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis can be calculated, and this approach was used to test these predictions in the second experiment.
Experiment 2
The present-value comparison hypothesis assumes that individuals choose between a smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later reward by comparing their discounted, present values. As noted previously, it is difficult to predict the present value of the sooner reward when the typical adjusting-amount procedure is used, because of the dependence of discounting rate on the amount of the reward. When the amount of the later reward is very large, however, then even the amount of the sooner reward is likely to be large enough that it is discounted at approximately the same rate as the later reward (Green et al., 1997 (Green et al., , 1999 .
It may be shown that when the sooner and later rewards are discounted at similar rates, the present-value comparison hypothesis predicts that discounting will be described by Equation 1 with D equal to the interreward interval, denoted as IRI, and the discounting rate parameter, which we denote as kЈ, equal to k /(1ϩ k ⅐ D S ), where k is the value of the discounting rate parameter when the sooner reward is available immediately, and D S is the delay to the sooner reward:
Thus, the present-value comparison hypothesis predicts that the discounting rate parameter decreases as the delay to the sooner reward is increased, but the form of the discounting function does not change (for the derivation of Equation 2, see the Present-Value Comparison Hypothesis section in the Appendix). Like the present-value comparison hypothesis, the commonaspect attenuation hypothesis assumes that individuals compare the present values of sooner and later rewards. It differs from the present-value comparison hypothesis, however, in assuming that the present value of sooner and later rewards is not based on the full delay to each. Rather, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis assumes that individuals place less weight on the common aspect of the two delays (i.e., the time to the sooner reward). When sooner and later rewards are discounted at similar rates, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis predicts that discounting will be described by Equation 2 with kЈ equal to k /(1ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ), where w is the weight applied to the delay to the sooner reward (for the derivation, see the Common-Aspect Attenuation Hypothesis section in the Appendix).
Thus, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, like the present-value comparison hypothesis, predicts that as the delay to the sooner reward is increased, the discounting rate parameter decreases, but the form of the discounting function remains unchanged. However, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis predicts a smaller effect of increasing the delay to the sooner reward on the value of the discounting rate parameter, kЈ, because the value of w is assumed to be less than 1.0 (to represent attenuation). The two hypotheses may be distinguished analytically by fitting Equation 2 with kЈ equal to k /(1ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ) to the data. An estimated value of w less than 1.0 would support the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, whereas an estimated value of w approximately equal to 1.0 would support the presentvalue comparison hypothesis.
In order to ensure that the sooner and later rewards were discounted at similar rates, we used very large amounts (i.e., $100,000 and $250,000) for the later rewards in Experiment 2, and the value of k estimated when the sooner reward was available immediately was used to predict discounting when a delay was added before the sooner reward. Thus, Experiment 2 provided an opportunity to evaluate the quantitative predictions of the presentvalue comparison and common-aspect attenuation hypotheses, while at the same time assessing the replicability of the results of Experiment 1 as well as their extension to choices involving much larger amounts of reward.
Method
Participants. Twenty-two undergraduates at Washington University were recruited through the participants pool maintained by the Department of Psychology and received course credit for their participation.
Procedure. Participants were tested using exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 1 except that the amounts of the later rewards were $100,000 and $250,000. Table 2 presents median subjective values of the later reward, expressed as a proportion of the actual amount ($100,000 or $250,000). As in Experiment 1, temporal discounting (i.e., a decrease in the subjective value of the later reward as the interreward interval increased) was observed in all conditions as may be seen by reading across the rows of Table 2 . There was an effect of delay to the sooner reward similar to that observed in Experiment 1. For each amount at each interreward interval, the subjective value of the later reward tends to increase as the delay to the sooner reward increases as may be seen by reading down the columns of the upper and lower portions of Table 2 .
Results
In order to test the present-value comparison and commonaspect attenuation hypotheses, it was necessary that the amounts of the later rewards be large enough that the subjectively equivalent amounts of the sooner reward would be discounted at rates similar to the rates at which the later rewards were discounted. Consistent with this requirement, there appear to be no systematic differences in the discounting of the two amounts (i.e., there was no evidence of a magnitude effect). This may be seen by comparing the subjective values of the $100,000 reward at each delay to the sooner reward and interreward interval (presented in the upper portion of Table 2 ) to the corresponding values for the $250,000 reward (presented in the lower portion of Table 2 ). Figure 4 shows fits of the hyperbolic discounting model with s equal to 1.0 to the group median subjective values from Table 2. For ease of comparison, conventions are the same as in Figure 1 . The four panels present data for the four different delays to the sooner reward; within each panel, circles represent data for the smaller, $100,000 delayed amount and squares represent data for the larger, $250,000 delayed amount. The fits to the smaller and larger amounts are represented by the solid and dashed curves, respectively. The model accounted for more than 90% of the variance in all eight cases. In addition, the median R 2 across the eight cases was determined for each individual, and the mean of these values was .812. Allowing s to be a free parameter did not significantly improve the fits to the group medians. The parameter s was significantly less than 1.0 for 3 of the 22 participants and did not differ significantly from 1.0 for the other 19 participants.
As the delay to the sooner reward increased, the value of the k parameter for the simple hyperbola fit to the group median data shown in Figure 4 decreased from 0.0122 to 0.0053 for the $100,000 delayed reward and from 0.0109 to 0.0058 for the $250,000 delayed reward. A repeated measures ANOVA on the logarithms of the individual k values revealed a main effect of delay to the sooner reward, F(3, 63) ϭ 14.19, p Ͻ .001, but as predicted, there was no main effect of amount, F(1, 21) ϭ 2.74, ns. The lack of a main effect of amount indicates that the smaller ($100,000) and larger ($250,000) amounts were discounted at similar rates. There was no interaction between amount and delay, F(3, 63) ϭ 1.25, ns. A within-subjects contrast revealed a linear trend for delay to the sooner reward, F(1, 21) ϭ 17.34, p Ͻ .001, indicating that the rate of discounting decreased systematically as the delay to the sooner reward increased. Similar results were obtained in a parallel set of analyses using the area-under-thecurve measure of discounting. There was a main effect of delay, F(3, 63) ϭ 20.86, p Ͻ .001, but no effect of amount, F(1, 21) ϭ 2.35, ns, and no interaction between amount and delay, F(3, 63) Ͻ 1.00. Again, a within-subjects contrast revealed a significant linear trend for delay to the sooner reward, F(1, 21) ϭ 27.30, p Ͻ .001. Not only were the $100,000 and $250,000 amounts discounted at similar rates but the $10,000 reward used in Experiment 1 also was discounted at a similar rate to the $100,000 reward used in Experiment 2. Comparisons of both the logarithms of the kЈ values and the areas under the curve failed to reveal a significant difference in the discounting of $10,000 and $100,000 delayed rewards when the sooner reward was available immediately: both ts(50) Ͻ 1.0. Because in Experiment 2 even the smallest amount of sooner reward judged equal in subjective value to the later reward was well above $10,000, one can assume that sooner amounts were discounted at similar rates to later amounts, thereby making it possible to derive testable predictions from both the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect hypothesis. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the predictions of the presentvalue comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis. Both hypotheses correctly predict an increase in area under the curve (resulting from a decrease in discounting rate) with increases in the delay to the sooner reward. As may be seen, however, the present-value comparison hypothesis systematically overestimates the area because it underestimates the discounting rate, whereas the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis (with w estimated to be 0.55 based on a least squares fit to the data in the figure) not only captures the overall pattern of systematic increases in the area under the discounting curve but also accurately predicts the areas under these curves. Fitting the equation that, according to the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, governs the relation between the discounting rate parameter and the delay to the sooner reward, kЈ ϭ k/(1ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ), directly to the median kЈ values also yielded an estimate of w ϭ 0.55.
Discussion
As predicted, no magnitude effect was observed in Experiment 2, but in other respects the pattern of results replicated that observed in Experiment 1, thereby extending the findings of the first experiment to situations in which much larger rewards were involved. The absence of a magnitude effect when very large rewards were used, regardless of the delay to the sooner reward, replicates and extends previous results regarding the effect of amount of reward on temporal discounting in studies in which the choice was between an immediate and a delayed reward (e.g., Green et al., 1997 Green et al., , 1999 .
Although the participants probably had little, if any, direct experience with amounts as large as those in Experiment 2, none of them reported difficulties in making decisions involving such large amounts, and the data were as orderly as those from Experiment 1, which involved much smaller amounts. Moreover, the large amounts used in Experiment 2 may not be unrealistic for undergraduates to consider given that at least some of them had already made decisions about possible careers involving annual salaries that might reach the amounts used in this experiment.
With respect to the overall pattern of results, once again temporal discounting in choice between two delayed rewards was well described by a hyperbola-like function, and the degree of discounting decreased as a function of the delay to the sooner reward. The systematic decrease in the degree of discounting as the delay to the sooner reward increased observed in both experiments is inconsistent with the idea that when choosing between sooner and later rewards, people ignore the common aspect of both alternatives (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky, 1972) . Instead, the present findings show that people discount the larger reward less steeply when time is added to the delays to both sooner and later rewards and that this result, originally observed in Experiment 1, holds also for very large amounts.
Although the hypothesis that people completely ignore common aspects of choice alternatives was not supported, the results are qualitatively consistent with the present-value comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, both of which predict that discounting of the later reward will increase with the delay to the sooner reward. These hypotheses may be distinguished, however, based on their quantitative predictions. The present-value comparison hypothesis systematically underestimated the degree of discounting when a delay was imposed before the sooner reward, whereas the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis provided a more accurate fit to the present data.
General Discussion
The present study examined the role of temporal discounting in choice between two delayed rewards and thus represents an important extension of previous discounting research that, for the most part, has focused on choice between immediate and delayed rewards. In two experiments, the delay to the sooner reward, the interreward interval (i.e., the time between the sooner and later rewards), and the amount of the later reward were each varied over a large range. In both experiments, a simple hyperbola (Equation 1 with s ϭ 1.0) was found to describe choice between two delayed rewards at the group level. This finding is consistent with many previous studies on choice between an immediate and a delayed reward, although in some cases s has been found to be significantly less than 1.0 (for a review, see Green & Myerson, 2004) . When Equation 1 was fit to data from individual participants in the present experiments, s was significantly less than 1.0 for some participants but was never significantly greater than 1.0, consistent with individual data in previous studies involving choice between immediate and delayed rewards (e.g., Myerson & Green, 1995; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000) .
In Experiment 1, a magnitude effect was observed such that when the later reward was small ($200), its value was discounted more steeply than when the later reward was large ($10,000). No magnitude effect was observed in Experiment 2, however, which used larger reward amounts (i.e., $100,000 and $250,000). Moreover, no magnitude effect was observed when the results for the $10,000 delayed amount in Experiment 1 were compared with the results for the $100,000 delayed amount in Experiment 2. These findings are consistent with those of previous studies (e.g., Green et al., 1997 ; for quantitative reviews, see Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997) that showed that as the amount of delayed reward is increased, the degree of discounting initially decreases but then levels off as the amount of the delayed reward is increased further. The present results considerably extend the generality of these earlier findings, all of which were obtained in experiments involving choice between immediate and delayed rewards, by demonstrating that the same pattern of results is observed in situations in which both rewards are delayed.
Perhaps the most important finding of the present study is that the rate of discounting decreased as the delay to the sooner reward was increased. This finding is consistent with the phenomenon of decreasing absolute sensitivity (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) in which adding a constant to all values of an attribute decreases the influence of that attribute. In the present experiments, adding a constant to both the delay to the sooner reward and the delay to the later reward decreased the influence of the time dimension, thereby increasing the relative influence of the monetary dimension. This decreased influence of the time dimension is reflected in the finding that temporal discounting was steepest when the sooner reward was immediate but became progressively more shallow as the delay to the sooner reward was increased.
The results of the present study, and in particular the finding of decreased absolute sensitivity to delay, bear directly on several hypotheses regarding the mechanisms underlying discounting. The fact that the discounted value of the later reward was substantially affected by the delay to the sooner reward is clearly inconsistent with the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis. This is because the delay to the sooner reward is the kind of common aspect of the choice alternatives that, according to the hypothesis, should have been completely ignored by the participants in the present study.
In contrast, the present finding of decreasing absolute sensitivity to delay is at least qualitatively consistent with both the presentvalue comparison hypothesis and the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis in that both predict (correctly) that later rewards will be discounted less steeply as the delay to the sooner reward increases. These two hypotheses may be distinguished, however, based on the weight assigned to the delay to the sooner reward. The presentvalue comparison hypothesis assumes that sooner and later rewards each are evaluated based on the full delay from the time at which the choice is made until the point at which they can be received. In contrast, the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis assumes that less weight is placed on the interval from the choice point until the sooner reward is available on the grounds that this interval is a common aspect of the delays to both the sooner and later rewards. According to this hypothesis, common aspects are not eliminated in the evaluation of delayed rewards, as the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis would have it, but they do receive less weight in the decision-making process.
One may view the three models as lying along a continuum that has the elimination-by-aspects and the present-value comparison hypotheses as its endpoints, with the range in between corresponding to the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis. This may be seen most clearly by considering the case in which the amounts involved are large enough so that both sooner and later rewards are discounted at equivalent rates as was the case in Experiment 2. Under these circumstances, the predictions of all three models can be represented mathematically by Equation 2:
According to the elimination-by-aspects hypothesis, w equals 0.0; according to the present-value comparison hypothesis, w equals 1.0; and according to the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, the value of w falls somewhere in between these two extremes. When w (i.e., the weight applied to the common delay) was made a free parameter, a weight of 0.55 was found to provide the best fit to the data from Experiment 2. Thus, the common aspect of the choice alternatives (i.e., the delay to the sooner reward) was neither ignored nor given full weight but had an attenuated influence on the present value of the delayed rewards, consistent with the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis.
Importantly, the present argument continues to hold when the discounting function has the general form given in Equation 1 (i.e., when s does not equal 1.0). As shown in the Appendix (see the Hyperbola-Like Discounting section), it follows from the same logic used to derive Equation 2 that when V ϭ A/(1 ϩ kD) s , and the sooner and later rewards are both discounted at the same rate, then
where kЈ again equals k/(1 ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ). Thus, the argument that all three hypotheses may be placed within a common discounting framework is a general one and does not depend on the discounting function's being a simple hyperbola.
Conclusion
The present study is the first to examine discounting functions obtained when both rewards are delayed and to compare the present-value comparison hypothesis with two important theoretical alternatives, the elimination-by-aspects and common-aspect attenuation hypotheses. The results show that the same hyperbolalike discounting function describes choice behavior regardless of whether one or both rewards are delayed. Importantly, the rate parameter of the discounting function decreases systematically as the delay to the sooner reward is increased.
This finding is consistent with decreasing absolute sensitivity (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) in that time comes to play a progressively smaller role in decision making, relative to amount of reward, as the delays to both rewards grow longer. A temporal discounting function based on the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, according to which the common aspect of the two choice alternatives (i.e., the time until the sooner reward is available) is given less weight, provided a good fit to the data, suggesting that this hypothesis may provide an explanation for the phenomenon of decreasing absolute sensitivity in intertemporal choice.
Mathematical Derivations

Present-Value Comparison Hypothesis
The present-value comparison hypothesis assumes that an individual choosing between two delayed rewards compares the present value of the sooner reward (V S ) with the present value of the later reward (V L ), and that both rewards are hyperbolically discounted:
and
where the variables A, D, and k refer to amount, delay, and the discounting rate parameter, respectively, and the subscripts S and L refer to the sooner and later rewards. For present purposes, it is useful to rewrite Equation A2 so as to distinguish between the common and unique aspects of the delay to the later reward. That is, the delay to the later reward (D L ) consists of the delay to the sooner reward (D S ), which is the common aspect, plus the interreward interval, denoted as IRI, which is the unique aspect. Thus, D L ϭ D S ϩ IRI, and substituting into Equation A2 yields
If, as in the present experimental procedures, the amount of the sooner reward is adjusted until its present value is equal to the present value of the later reward (i.e., until V S ϭ V L ), then
Solving for A S yields
In general, the preceding equation cannot predict A S because k S is itself a decreasing function of A S , and the mathematical form of the function relating k values to amount of delayed reward is not known. It is known, however, that the value of k levels off as A becomes very large. Therefore, if A L is sufficiently large, as in Experiment 2, then even though A S is smaller than A L , it still will be large enough so that k S will be equal to k L , and thus both rate parameters can be represented by a single k. The denominator of the right-hand expression in Equation A5 is equivalent to 1 ϩ k L ⅐ D S ϩ k L ⅐ IRI, and thus when a single k is used, Equation A5 may be rewritten as
When the equation is written in this form, it may be seen that dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand expression in Equation A6 by 1 ϩ k ⅐ D S and simplifying yields
where kЈ ϭ k / (1 ϩ k ⅐ D S ). Note that Equation A7 is hyperbolic in form, and that the discounting rate parameter, kЈ, decreases as the delay to the sooner reward, D S , increases.
Common-Aspect Attenuation Hypothesis
The common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, like the present-value comparison hypothesis, assumes that an individual choosing between two delayed rewards compares the present value of the sooner reward (V S ) with the present value of the later reward (V L ) and that both rewards are hyperbolically discounted. What distinguishes the two hypotheses is that the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis assumes that because the delay to the later reward is equal to the time to the sooner reward plus the interreward interval (i.e., D L ϭ D S ϩ IRI), the influence of the time to the sooner reward may be attenuated when an individual assesses the present value of the later reward. Thus, when the later reward is very large and both rewards are discounted at approximately the same rate (k), the present values of the sooner and later rewards are given by
where w represents the (lesser) weight given to the delay to the sooner reward (0 Ͻ w Ͻ 1). When the amount of the sooner reward is adjusted until its present value is equal to the present value of the later reward, then (following the same logic previously used to derive predictions for the present-value comparison hypothesis)
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand expression in Equation A10 by 1 ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S and simplifying yields
where kЈ ϭ k / (1 ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ). Note that Equation A11, like Equation A7, is hyperbolic in form, and that, again, the discounting rate parameter, kЈ, decreases as the delay to the sooner reward increases.
Hyperbola-Like Discounting
The general form of the hyperbola-like discounting function (Equation 1) includes an exponent. Although an exponent less than 1.0 was not needed to describe the group data in the present study, it was needed to describe the data from some individuals, and it has been found necessary to describe group data in other studies (Green & Myerson, 2004) . Including the exponent does not change the logic of the derivation of the discounting function for choice between two delayed rewards as shown in the following. Our derivation includes a weight (w) for the shorter delay as specified by the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, because this formulation includes the present-value comparison as a special case (i.e., the case when w ϭ 1.0).
Assume that when the later reward is very large, so that both rewards are discounted at approximately the same rate, k, the present values of the sooner and later rewards are given by
When the amount of the sooner reward is adjusted until its present value is equal to the present value of the later reward, then
which may be rewritten as
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the expression in brackets in the preceding equation by 1 ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S and simplifying yields
where kЈ ϭ k / (1 ϩ k ⅐ w ⅐ D S ). Note that Equation A16, like Equation 1, is hyperbola-like in form and that, again, the discounting rate parameter, kЈ, decreases as the delay to the sooner reward increases. Thus, the form of the discounting function when choice is between two delayed rewards is the same as when the sooner reward is available immediately (i.e., when D S ϭ 0.0, D ϭ IRI, and kЈ ϭ k).
